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1 Introduction
From the end of the ’70s, the European labour market has been characterized
by high and persistent unemployment rate. A large consensus exists among
economists to consider the high regulation of the labour market as the principal
reason of this phenomenon. In order to solve this problem measures have been
suggested for increasing flexibility in the labour market, with the introduction of
atypical contractual forms (in particular, fixed-term contracts and temporary
contracts) characterized by low hiring and firing costs. The reforms inspired
to this principle have given, generally, good results in terms of reduction of
unemployment rates and dynamicity of labour markets.
Spain is a good documented example of this phenomenon; the introduction of
temporary contracts goes back to 1984 and the use of these contractual forms has
increased during the last twenty years. Today more than thirty percent of the
contracts existing in Spain are temporary contracts, and about ninety percent
of the new contracts stipulated are of the non-permanent type. The effects on
the unemployment rate, even if with delay, have been positive and, at the same
time, a more dynamicity in the labour market is determined as a consequence of
the increase of flow-out and flow-in unemployment and employment (cfr. Güell).
However, the introduction of fixed-term contracts has generated some effects on
other dimensions of the labour market. For example, Maia Güell (2003) shows
that these reforms have increased the duration dependence for unemployment
spells, proving increased duality between short-term unemployed (STU) and
long-term unemployed (LTU).
As showed by Blanchard and Diamond (1994), if firms rank unemployed
workers and hire those with the shortest spells of unemployment, then the exit
rate from unemployment is a decreasing function of duration. Moreover to
the extent that firms do not hire randomly, it is quite possible that duration
dependence of unemployment might have increased after the introduction of
temporary contracts. Furthermore, as showed by Maia Güell (2003), let us
consider an extreme situation in which only certain key individual characteristics
(e.g. age, gender, qualification, etc.) make unemployed workers more likely to
be re-employed. An analogous ranking model based on characteristics maintain
these advantages, they continue to have a higher re-employment probability
when they return to unemployment after their temporary contracts finish.
Another important point here discussed considers the effect of previous atyp-
ical contract experiences on the probability of moving toward a stable job. Some
studies related to the Spanish labour market, Alba-Ramirez (1998) and Amuedo-
Dorantes (2000), show that the probability of obtaining a permanent contract
decreases after some previous atypical contracts. On this topic, Maia Güell
and Barbara Petrongolo (2004) find that the conversion rate from temporary
to permanent contract is rather low and concentrates close to the deadline of
the temporary contract. In the context of European labour market, Zijl, van
den Berg and Heyma (2004) and van den Berg, Holm and van Ours (2002),
show that the temporary contract provides a stepping stone effect toward a
permanent job.
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In Italy, the introduction of fixed-term contracts and temporary contracts
(from now on I will indicate them jointly as atypical contracts), has been the
outcome of numerous laws (see table 1) that yet have left the use of these
contractual forms at the margin, at least before the introduction of the Treu
Law (L. 196/97) and subsequently of the Biagi Law (L. 30/03).
In this paper I analyze the effect of the introduction of the Treu Law, which
has been the first attempt to make the Italian labour market more flexible. This
package has introduced temporary contracts (or interim contracts), in addition
to some modifications in order to extend and to improve the fixed-term contract
regulations (in particular CFL and apprenticeship contracts). The reform has
been introduced in years which the Italian labour market was characterized by
its highest unemployment rate (11.3%). Generally, the reform has involved a
partial increase of the atypical contracts supply (between 1997 and 1999 the
stock of atypical contract has increased by about 20%, see table 2), making
more flexible the labour market and contributing to increase the employment
growth and to reduce the unemployment rate (see table 2). The data show that
the number of atypical contracts has increased by about forty percent, going
from twenty to thirty percent of total contracts (table 3).
The growth of atypical contract opportunities, in addition to the effects on
employment growth and on the unemployment rate, can affect other labour mar-
ket dimensions. In particular, some recent studies, by Gagliarducci (2005) and
Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2005) on the Italian labour market, show that the
atypical contract experiences can affect the probability of reaching a permanent
contract. Gagliarducci (2005), in a pre-reform study, shows that the proba-
bility of obtaining a permanent contract increases with the temporary contract
duration, but decreases with the number of temporary contract experiences, spe-
cially if interrupted by unemployment spells. In another study, related to the
post reform period, conducted using Temporary Work Agencies (TWA) data,
Ichino et al. (2005), find that TWA employment creates a “springboard” toward
permanent jobs, where the TWA jobs are considered as treatment assignment.
The aim of this paper is to address questions linked to the Italian labour
market reform, introduced by the Treu Law. The most interesting aspect of
this work depends on the availability of data on pre and post reform period.
Up to my knowledge, a specific analysis of this argument is not available. In
particular, here I consider whether:
1. The duration dependence related to the non-working spell has changed
after the introduction of the Treu Law;
2. Atypical contract experiences in individual work histories affect the prob-
ability of obtaining a stable job;
3. An atypical contract experience provides a stepping stone effect toward a
permanent contract.
The first contribution concerns the effects of the reform on the duration
dependence. These effects are directly linked with the increase of the offer
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of atypical contracts that is characterized by an increase in both inflows and
outflows between unemployment and employment. As anticipated, from a the-
oretical point of view (see Güell, 2004), I predict an increase of the duration
dependence, with consequent amplification of the duality between STU and
LTU. In a rigid labour market, with few job opportunities, long-term unem-
ployment may not be an indicator of low productivity. On the contrary, in a
more flexible labour market, characterized by more probabilities to find a job,
long-term unemployment can be an important signal of low productivity, which
firms can use in order to select potential employees. In other words, this would
lead to an increase in STU’s, and to a reduction in LTU’s probability of leaving
unemployment. Given these considerations, if the empirical analysis confirms
this prediction, we can conclude that the larger use of atypical contracts would
provide a screening instrument for the hiring policy of firms. At the same time,
we can also conclude that the increased duality between STU and LTU would
require job policies in order to provide suitable training for unqualified workers.
With respect to the probability of obtaining a stable job, a negative effect is
probably played by the previous atypical contract experiences. In fact, employ-
ment in an atypical contract followed by unemployment can be interpreted as
an indicator of bad qualities of the worker in the previous job. It follows that
direct hiring with a permanent contract is unlikely. More likely, an individual
in non-working state and with previous atypical job experiences, will be hired
with a new atypical contract so that the firm can test the worker’s ability. As
anticipated, some previous studies confirm this tendency as Gagliarducci (2005),
Alba-Ramirez (1998) and Amuedo-Dorantes (2000).
On the other hand, many authors, as Zijl et al. (2004), van den Berg et
al. (2002) and Ichino et al. (2005), find that the probability to move toward a
permanent contract is higher if the individual starts from an atypical contract
state rather than from a non-working condition. In other words, the atypi-
cal contract shows a stepping stone effect toward a stable job, which can be
explained in terms of firm preferences to hire workers that have accumulated
human capital during the latest situations.
In my analysis I use the WHIP (Work Histories Italian Panel) dataset, pro-
vided by the “Laboratorio Revelli” of Turin in their standard version. WHIP
is a database of individual working histories, based on the INPS (National In-
stitute of Social Security) administrative archives, that permits to construct
the sequence of monthly contiguous spells. In order to obtain a homogenous
sub-sample, from a legislative point of view, I have selected only observations
between 1995 and 1999, concerning young individuals, of age ranging between 16
and 32. In order to catch the effects linked with the presence of repeated spells
and multiple risks, I implement a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model
with competing risk. The MPH model consists of a specification of the Propor-
tional Hazard Model that allows for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
across individuals.
Anticipating my main results, I show that the duration dependence related
to transitions from a non-employment state toward a permanent contract or
atypical contract has slightly decreased after the introduction of the Treu Law.
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In particular, I find an increase of STU hazard rate (composed by a small
decrease in the probability of moving toward a permanent contract and by an
increase in the probability of reaching a new atypical contract) and a significant
decrease of LTU hazard rate. This evidence seems to confirm that the increase
of the availability of atypical contracts could provide a screening instrument
for hiring policies of firms. Besides, I find that the previous atypical contract
experiences have a negative effect on the probability of moving from a non-
working condition toward a permanent contract, but that the effect is reduced
in the post-reform period. Finally, there are no evidences that the probability of
reaching a stable job is higher if the original state is an atypical contract rather
than a non-working state. However, a positive duration dependence is found for
the transitions from an atypical contract toward another contract, confirming
that the accumulating of human capital during an AC experience increases the
probability of finding a new job.
2 Data and Institutional background
2.1 The Treu Law
I define atypical contracts all the contractual forms that do not provide a perma-
nent work relation: fixed-term contracts (that I can not identify in the dataset),
apprenticeship contracts, CFL (or work training contracts) and temporary con-
tracts (or interim contracts). Atypical contracts are regulated by numerous
laws introduced since 1955, when the first regulation related to apprenticeship
contracts was established. In the latest fifty years the atypical contracts legis-
lation has not much varied until the introduction of the Biagi Law (L. 30/03),
which has provided an important revision of atypical contracts regulation. Be-
fore the introduction of the Biagi Law, the main reform implemented was the
Treu reform.
The Treu Law was introduced on June, 24 1997 (law 196/97) with the aim to
make the Italian labour market more flexible, in order to make it more dynamic
and to promote the decrease of the unemployment rate. The main novelty of
the reform consisted in the introduction of temporary contract (articles from
1 to 11) and in the creation of Temporary Work Agencies (law 469/97), so
that jobcentres were privatized and decentralized. The Treu Package also mod-
ified sanctionatory discipline of fixed-term contracts (art. 12) and modified the
regulation related to employment in the research sector (art. 14). Finally, it
extended the CFL applicability for depressed areas and for individuals with in-
validity (art. 15), and it rose from 22 to 24 the age limit for apprenticeship
contracts (art. 16).
Fixed-term contracts. The fixed-term contract permits the hiring of a worker
for a pre-determinate duration. They were introduced in Italian legislation in
1962 (law 230/62). Subsequently the fixed-term contract regulation was modi-
fied by laws 56/87 and 416/93.
Apprenticeship contracts. The apprenticeship contract is a contractual form
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which obliges the entrepreneur to give the worker the basic notions necessary
to transform him in a qualified worker. The legal duration of an apprenticeship
contract ranges between 18 months and 4 years, with some exception for the
hand craft sector. They were introduced with law 25/55 and were not modified
until the introduction of the Treu reform.
CFL (work training contracts). The CFL were introduced in order ease the
entry in the labour market. They have a determined duration: one year in order
to acquire low qualifications and two years in order to acquire high qualifications.
The CFL were introduced in 1984 with law 863/84, and they were modified with
law 56/87, which extended their applicability to all economic sectors, and with
law 451/94, which raised from 29 to 32 the age limit for their applicability.
Temporary contracts. They were introduced by the Treu Package and law
469/97, according to which jobcentres were privatized and decentralized. TWA
employment represents a triangular contract, in which an agency hires a worker
for the purpose of making him available for a client firm for a temporary assign-
ment.
2.2 The Biagi Law
I present here a summary of the new atypical contracts introduced by the Biagi
Law (law 30/03), which has implemented the latest reform of the Italian labour
market. The aim of the Biagi Law was to increase in few years the employment
rate in the belief that development must be accompanied by the ability to create
additional workplaces. The law has introduced new contractual forms and has
innovated some existing ones, affecting mainly subordinated jobs. I list the main
new contractual forms:
Job on call. In this case workers are available for employers for intermittent
job services. It can be permanent or not.
Job sharing. Two workers commit themselves to carry out a single job.
Everybody is responsible to do the complete work.
Part-time. It is a job of reduced time with respect to normal hours, fixed at
forty per week.
Apprenticeship. It provides three types of contracts. The first relates to the
straight-dust of education and training. The second relates to the attainment
of a qualification by job training and technical-professional learning. The third
is used in order to obtain a certificate or for high-training paths.
Insertion contract. It substitutes the CFL (which continues to be applied
in public administration). It is a fixed-term contract with a duration ranging
between 9 and 18 months. It aims at easing workers’ integration or reintegration
by an adaptive path of professional competences.
Co.Co.Pro.. It changes the Continuative and Coordinate Collaboration
(Co.Co.Co), which are put into context in a project or a plan.
Secondary jobs. It refers to an activity of at most thirty days in the year
with a salary of at most 3000 euro
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2.3 Data
In my study I use the WHIP (Work Histories Italian Panel) data, in its standard
version, provided by the “Laboratorio Revelli” of Turin. WHIP is a database
of individual working histories, based on the INPS (National Institute of Social
Security) administrative archives, and consists of a representative sample with
a dynamic population of 370.000 individuals. For each individual it is possible
to identify all work relationships, and their contractual forms; the information
is inferred by the contributions paid to INPS. From the type of contributions
it is possible to distinguish individuals employed with a permanent contract
(contributions which do not provide for special term, contributions related to
“reintroduction” contracts and contributions related to particular permanent
contract) or with an atypical contract (contributions related to CFLs (work
training contracts), contributions related to temporary (or interim) contracts
and contributions related to apprenticeship contracts). Still unidentifiable are
individuals employed with specific atypical contracts: workers employed with a
fixed-term contract, and employed with the Continuative and Coordinate Col-
laboration (Co.Co.Co.) contract, since the Italian legislation classify them as
self-employed.
Monthly information is available, therefore it is possible to determine the
monthly duration of each spell, directly from the dataset for the employed,
and indirectly the non-working ones (as the difference between the end of the
previous contract and the start of the subsequent one).
The database comprises information from 1985 to 1999, but I used only
the information from 1995 and 1999, related to individual with age included
between 16 and 32, in order to dispose of an homogenous sub-sample from a
legislative point of view (before the introduction of Treu Law, the previous
change in the atypical contract legislation was introduced in 1994). However,
the availability of information since 1985 and the use of a sub-sample including
only young individuals, makes it possible to reconstruct individual work histories
with accuracy, for example reporting the number of previous atypical contract
experiences in order to evaluate their effect on the transition rates.
Constructing my sub-sample, if an individual presents, at the same time,
more than one work relationship, I eliminate the shorter job relationship and,
if of the same duration, I remove the part-time jobs or the work relationships
characterized by fewer days of effective work. Finally, when the second job
starts before of the end of the first job but ends after it, I censor at left the
second work spell, and so I hypothesize that the second job starts only when
the first ends. In this way, the passage from double job to single one is found
as a transition from a job to another. This strategy is adopted in order to
reconstruct the non-working duration spells with accuracy. By adopting this
procedure I implicitly assume that the selection of young individuals and the
elimination of multiple jobs leave the final sample to be representative.
The comparison between the pre reform situation and the post reform one,
is carried out dividing the selected sub-sample in two sub-groups, the first re-
lated to the spells started and ended before June 24th 1997 (day in which the
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Treu Package became law), and the second related to the spells started after the
introduction of the law. Finally, I consider as right censored spell all the spells
started before the Treu Package introduction and ended after it, censoring them
on June 24th 1997. This procedure leaves me 29803 spells (13053 permanent
contract spells, 3805 atypical contract spells and 12945 non-working spells) re-
lated to the pre reform period and 41003 spells (15755 PC spells, 6705 AC spells
and 18543 NW spells) in the post reform one.
Table 3 reports the evolution of share of new atypical contracts stipulated in
Italy from 1985 to 1999 and from 1995 to 1999. As can be noted, a heterogeneous
increase of atypical contracts stipulated is found. Clearly a different growth rate
is noted if the origin is placed in 1985 or in 1995: in particular it is respectively,
meanly, +170% and + 38%. With respect to the period from 1985 and 1999, the
higher growth rates of the number of atypical contracts stipulated are found for
northern workers (about +245%), women (about +210%) and above all for high
skill workers (+1500%). In particular before or up to 1985 only 1.50% of the
latter group worked with an atypical contract, against about 25% in 1999. As
regards the period between 1995 and 1999, I find that, from a territorial point
of view, the North-east of Italy is characterized by a higher atypical job rate
(34%), but also by a lower growth rate (25%).The North-west is confirmed as the
area characterized by the higher growth in atypical contracts stipulated (54%),
while the growth rate in the southern regions is 41%. Stronger differences are
found related to gender and qualification variables. In particular, in the post-
reform period the growth rate of atypical contracts has been double for women
compared to men (55% against 28%), determining an overtake of female rate
(in pre-reform period male rate was about 23%-25% against 20%-21% of female
rate, while in 1999 this became 30% for men and 32% for women). A very strong
difference in growth rate can be noticed referring to the qualification variable.
Our data show that the growth rate of high skill workers (or white collars) is
about 115% against 32% for low skill workers. The growth rate of the atypical
contracts remains higher for the latter (33% against 25%).
The independent variables directly or indirectly available from the dataset
concern individual job-related characteristics. In particular, I use information
about age, gender (one dummy), territorial area (three dummies), qualification
(one dummy), economic sector (two dummies), tenure, number of previous atyp-
ical contract experiences (three dummies), daily wage related to the previous
job, part-time job experiences (one dummy). Finally, I introduce a variable
related to the macro-area employment growth in order to capture the business
cycle effect. In tables 3 and 4 I report some descriptive statistics. They show
that the age is lower if the original state is an atypical contract, both in the
pre and in the post reform period (respectively age 21 and 22). Instead, the
mean age is about 24, 25 if the origin state is a permanent contract or a non-
working condition. About 2/3 of my sample consists of male workers, and they
live more probably in the northern regions (about 60%), probability that in-
creases to 66%-68% if the origin state is an atypical contract. With regard to
the South of Italy, workers who stay in a permanent contract or a non-working
condition are about 24%-25%, while those who stay in an atypical contract are
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about 20%, confirming that the atypical contractual forms are less stated in
southern regions. With respect to qualification more than 80% of workers have
a low qualification (apprentice or blue collar); this percentage rises to 90% in
the pre-reform period if the origin state is an atypical contract, and to 84% in
post-reform period. This trend shows that in the post-reform period the use
of atypical contractual forms has experienced a main increase for white collars
as well. About 30% of observations are related to individuals who have been
employed in the building or in the tourism sectors. I found strong differences
related to the mean wage according to contractual forms. As expected, work-
ers employed in atypical jobs show a mean wage clearly below that of workers’
employed with a permanent contract (43 euro per day against 56 euro per day,
in the pre-reform period and 44 euro against 57 euro in post-reform one). The
observations related to actual or previous part-time job are about 12% in the
pre-reform period and 10% in post-reform one; these probabilities are smaller if
the origin state is an atypical job (4% in the pre-reform and 7% in post-reform
period). The amount of previous work experiences (tenure) is about 20 months.
This data is heterogeneous with respect to contract types; tenure related to per-
manent contract is about 30 months, while the one related to atypical contract
is about 12 months. Clearly this evidence is linked with the mean age of the
workers who stipulate different contractual forms, as showed before, and work
histories. About 57% of observations are characterized by absence of previous
atypical job experiences, a percentage that rises to 65% if the origin state is
a permanent contract and reduces to 51% if the origin state is a non-working
condition. These values remain substantially unchanged in the post-reform pe-
riod. Observations with one previous atypical contract experience is about 24%
(20% if the origin state is a permanent contract, 28% if the origin state is a
non-working state), while observations that are characterized by two previous
atypical contract experiences are about 10% and, finally, the ones with three or
more previous atypical job experiences are about 8%. The employment growth
rate is substantially different between pre and post -reform period, about +
0.12% before the introduction of the Treu Package and about 1.10% after.
3 Empirical specification
The specification of the model is guided by the standard job-search theory. It
is assumed that unemployed individuals devote some of their time searching for
jobs, but also that once an individual has accepted a job and starts working,
it could continue searching for a better job. Two types of jobs are considered
here: permanent jobs and atypical jobs. In addition I assume that: a permanent
employment is always preferred to an atypical job, except for cases in which the
conditions are linked to the permanent contract (i.e. job tasks). An individual
searching for a permanent employment can accept an atypical contract when the
search for a stable job takes too long. I also assume that an individual employee
with a permanent contract accepts to move toward an atypical contract, if this
offers better working conditions and/or perspectives. Finally, the transition
9
from a job toward a non working state can depend on the end of the contract,
dismissal, individual work preferences, etc.
Given the starting hypothesis, it is admissible that an individual stays in one
of the possible origin states: permanent contract (PC ), atypical contract (AC )
or a non working condition (NW ), therefore the follow transitions are admissible:
PC-PC, PC-TC, PC-NW, TC-PC, TC-TC, TC-NW, NW-PC, NW-TC.
By providing monthly information, the data allow for the analysis of indi-
vidual work history, permitting to identify the origin state and, in presence of
uncensored spells, the type of transition. Therefore, for each individual it is
possible to observe a sequence ti = {tci}c∈{1...Ci} of contiguous periods of time
(spells) spent in different states. t indicates the elapsed duration in a partic-
ular state, c denotes the cth spell of individual i and, following the previous
notations the left state indicates the state of origin, denoted by the first sub-
script (j), while the right state indicated the state of destination, denoted by
the second subscript (k).
In order to catch the effects linked with the presence of repeated spells and
multiple risks, I implement a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model with
competing risk1. The MPH model consists of a specification of the Proportional
Hazard Model that allows for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity between
individuals. As noticed, duration analysis ignoring the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity can imply biased estimates (Lancaster, 1990). Lancaster (1979)
was the first to treat this problem, proposing an estimate of a Proportional Haz-
ard Model with multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity. The main advantage
of this empirical specification is its flexibility, which allows me to take account
of the following determinants of the employment decision: state dependence,
duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. State dependence accounts
for the possibility that the transition probabilities depend on the origin and the
destination states, allowing to test whether the probability of transition into a
permanent contract are different for non workers and atypical employed indi-
viduals. Duration dependence accounts for the possibility that the time during
which an individual has been occupied in the current state affects the transition
probabilities. Finally, the unobservable heterogeneity is likely to matter in this
context due to differences in tastes, ability, or other characteristics that cannot
be observed by the econometrician.
A certain debate exists about the possible assumptions of unobserved het-
erogeneity distribution, since the MPH model estimates may be biased when the
chosen distribution for the unobservable term is incorrect. Heckman and Singer
(1984) showed that the problem can be avoided by using the Non-Parametric
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (NPMLE) that approximates the distribution
function of unobservables with a finite mixture distribution. In this case, as
1A competing risks model can be thought as a model for multiple durations that start
at the same point of time for a given subject, where the subject is observed until the first
duration is completed and one also observes which of the multiple durations is completed first.
The term ‘competing risks’ originates from the interpretation that a subject faces different
risks i of leaving the state it is in, each risk giving rise to its own exit destination which can
also be noted by i, (see van den Berg, 2005).
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proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984), the estimation is implemented by an
EM-algorithm.
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003b) proved that in a large class of hazard
models with proportional unobserved heterogeneity, the distribution of hetero-
geneity among survivors converges, often rapidly, to a gamma distribution. In
multiple spells duration analysis, often it is natural and convenient to assume
that such duration have identical unobserved heterogeneity terms V . From this,
in the MPH models for multiple-spell data, the multiple duration that a single
individual spends in the same state are dependent because they are affected by
the same realization of V .
Given these considerations, I assume that the hazard rate to state k after a
sojourn in state j for the individual i is defined as:
λijk(t
c
i |xijk, vijk;β) = λ0ijk(tci ) exp
³
x
0
ijkβjk
´
vijk
where:
1. λ0ijk is a baseline hazard which measures the effect of the elapsed duration
(duration dependence). Here assume that the baseline hazard follows a
Weibull distribution and therefore it can be expressed as:
λ0ijk(t
c
i ) = pjkt
pjk−1
i
with:
Positive duration dependence for pjk > 1
Negative duration dependence for pjk < 1
No duration dependence for pjk = 1
1. xijk is a vector of no-time varying individual covariates, which capture
personal, job-related and macroeconomic characteristics;
2. βjkis a vector of unknown parameters;
3. vijk is a random individual effect, which is intended to catch the effect of
individual heterogeneity. Here I assume that it is Gamma distributed.
V |X ∼ Γ (1, θ)
The model is in continuous time and the unit of time is one month. The
individual covariates xijk are fixed to their values at the beginning of each spell.
The individual contribution to the likelihood function of an incomplete (right
censored) spell, that is, the probability of surviving in state j until time t, can
be expressed as follows:
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Sj (t
c
i |Wi;Ω) = exp {−Λj (tci |Wi;Ω)}
where:
Λj =
tiR
0
P
k 6=j
λjk (s|Wi;Ω) ∂s2
is the corresponding integrated hazard function, Wi = {xijk, vijk}k 6=j is
the vector of all observed and unobserved variables and Ω is the vector of all
unknown parameters (β, θ).
The individual contribution to the likelihood function of a completed spell
of duration tci spends in state j that ends in state k is therefore:
fjk (t
c
i |Wi;Ω) = Si (tci |Wi;Ω)× λjk (tci |Wi;Ω)
In the first instance, to see how the model works, suppose that there is
no unobserved heterogeneity, that is, (vijk = 0). The contribution to the log-
likelihood function of an individual with a sequence of spells {ti1, ti2, . . . , tCii },
then is:
ln
³
Li
³
Ω|t1i , t2i , ..., tCii ;xi
´´
=
=
CiP
c=1
3P
j=1
"ÃP
k 6=j
dcjk ln (fjk (t
c
i |xi;Ω))
!
+ rcj ln (Sj (t
c
i |xi;Ω))
#
where dcjk is an indicator variable which equals one if the individual changed
from state j to state k in the cth spell and zero otherwise, and rcj is a dummy
variable which equals one if the cth spell is incomplete and zero otherwise. The
log-likelihood function for each sub-group (the first related to the pre-reform
period and the second related to the post-reform one) is the summation of the
previous equation over theN individuals. This log-likelihood formulation breaks
up into separable contributions from each type of transition. Therefore, given
that the hazard rate depends upon disjoint sets of parameters, the sub-likelihood
functions can be maximized separately and the parameters of each transition can
be estimated independently. In this version, without unobserved heterogeneity,
the standard errors are estimated using the Huber-White estimator in order to
obtain unbiased estimates of them. Differently, the usual standard error may
be incorrect because of the effects of clustered data. In this case, the variance
estimator becomes:
V ar = [I (b)]
−1
B [I (b)]
−1
whereB is a correction factor.
2Clearly is admitted that j = k for PC − PC and AC −AC transitions.
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When the unobserved heterogeneity term is introduced the model becomes
more complicated. In this case, in fact, it is not possible to condition the
individual probabilities on vijk since they are unobservable, but it is necessary
to integrate vijk over all possible values to get the unconditional probabilities. In
this sense, let us assume that individual effects are identically and independently
distributed for all individuals with a joint distribution function:
Γ (viPCPC,viPCAC,viPCNW,viACPC,viACAC,viACNW,viNWPC,viNWAC)
This specification imposes that the likelihood function maximization hap-
pens jointly, since the unobservable heterogeneity terms are correlated across
different transitions. For example, the observed transition rate from atypical
contract to permanent contract may be higher than the observed rate from
non-working to permanent job just because individuals for whom it is easy to
find regular work tend to self-select into atypical job. Then viNWTC is positively
related to viNWPC and viTCPC . It is possible that persons who most easily find
permanent job find less easily an atypical contract, which means that viNWTC
and viNWPC are negatively correlated.
Here, in order to simplify the estimation procedure, I assume that the vijk
terms are independent. In this case, then, it is possible to estimate separately
the sub-likelihood function by transition type. The individual sub-likelihood
function related to origin state j and destination state k, is:
Lijk
¡
Ω|tcji , xijk
¢
=
=
+∞R
−∞
Ã
CijQ
c=1
Q
k 6=j
fjk
¡
t
cj
i |xijk, vijk;Ω
¢dcijk × CijQ
c=1
Sj (t
ci
i |xijk, vijk;Ω)r
ci
j
!
×dΓ (vijk)
where cj indicates the cth spell in the state j. The log-likelihood function is
obtained by summation of the sub log-likelihood function respect to i, j and k:
ln (L (Ω|tci , xijk)) =
CijP
c=1
3P
j=1
P
k 6=j
ln (Lijk)
4 Results
Figures 1-10 show, as preliminary matter, how the Treu Package has affected
the duration dependence, if the probability transitions from a non-working state
to a permanent contract is affected by previous atypical job experiences and,
finally, if an atypical job experience provides a stepping-stone effect toward a
permanent contract.
Generally a slight decrease is found for duration dependence related to the
transition out a non-working state, confirming (from 0.96 to 0.90 for transi-
tions toward a permanent contract and from 0.96 to 0.92 for transitions toward
an atypical contract, see tables 6a and 6b), at least partially, theoretical pre-
dictions. These findings seem to suggest that in a more flexible labour market,
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characterized by higher probabilities to find a job, to be a LTU can be perceived
as a signal of low productivity by firms, determining a reduction in the LTU
hazard rate and, at the same time, an increase for the STU, who are more likely
to receive an offer. In particular, my results show that the related probability to
move out of a non-employment state is increases for the STU and decreases for
the LTU. However, a territorial difference is found in absolute effect terms. In
the northern regions (I show the results related to North-West), the hazard rate
for transitions toward a permanent contract is slightly decreased, while in the
southern regions it is clearly increased, above all for the STU. Anyway the haz-
ard rate remains higher (about 50%) for northern workers. Not distinguishing
about the destination state, the post-reform net effect is positive for the STU
living in the North-West (total hazard rate increases by about 0.5%), while the
net effect related to southern workers is negative (total hazard rate decreases
by about 2%). In the area including the south and the islands, the total effect
is visibly positive, above all for the STU (the hazard rate increases by about
2%), while for the LTU the increase is only about 0.5%-0.7%. In presence of
previous atypical job experiences (see figure 10 and 11, where I present the case
with three ore more previous AC experiences), these effects are confirmed, but
the differences between STU and LTU, at least in the northern regions, is less
strong and the STU (with no more than two months of unemployment) have
a higher hazard rate, for the transition toward a permanent contract, in the
post-reform period rather than in the pre-reform one.
With regard to the effect of previous atypical job experiences on the proba-
bility of reaching a permanent contract (see table 5a and 5b and figure 10 and
11), generally I find a positive effect if the origin state is a working state and a
negative effect if the origin state is a non-working one. Substantially, the Treu
Package has increased the positive effects and decreased the negative one, indi-
cating that to be in a non-working condition despite previous job experiences
can constitute a bad signal on worker productivity, reducing the probability to
move toward a stable job. Individuals with these characteristics, on the contrary,
have a higher probability to move toward a new atypical contract, meaning that
firms can hire them for the purpose of testing, once more, their ability and,
eventually, of hiring them in a stable position after the atypical job experience.
Finally, if the state of origin is a job position, there is not a bad signal and the
previous job experience is perceived as a higher accumulation of human capital.
Do atypical job experiences provide a stepping stone effect toward a per-
manent contract? I answer to this question comparing the probability to move
toward a stable job, starting from a non-working state or from an atypical
contract. The evidence shows that the hazard rate is higher if the state is a
non-working condition, a trend confirmed both for the pre-reform period and
the post-reform one3. However, related to this transition, a positive duration
3 In a previous version of this paper (where the firm size variable was included in my
analysis, and more of 20000 observations were crossed out, because of missing information
for firm dimension, most of them related to 1999), an opposite result is found related to the
post-reform period. In particular, there was evidence of a stepping stone effect for atypical
contract duration longer than three months. This result was strongly affected by the value of
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dependence is found, therefore the probability to move toward a permanent con-
tract increases with the contract duration, confirming the effect of a link with
human capital accumulation.
In tables 5a, 5b, 6a and 6b, I present the results obtained by MPH model
with competing risk and Weibull baseline hazard specification. Generally, in
the post-reform period, it emphasizes a decrease of the duration dependence
parameter (p) for the transitions out of a non-working state. Referring to the
transition toward a permanent contract, the model with unobserved heterogene-
ity, as anticipated, shows a reduction of the p parameter from 0.96 to 0.90 after
the introduction of the Treu Package. In the model without unobserved het-
erogeneity p is reduced from 0.92 to 0.85. The transitions toward an atypical
contract also are characterized by a decrease in p parameter, from 0.96 to 0.92,
both in the model with unobserved heterogeneity and in the one without random
effects. With regard to the transitions out of a job position, I find that after
the introduction of the Treu Package all duration dependence parameters are
reduced. The p parameters for the transitions toward a non-working condition,
in the post-reform period (0.90 if the state of origin is a permanent contract and
0.89 if the state of origin is an atypical contract), are less than one implying a
negative duration dependence. In other words, the probability to lose a job is
a decreasing function of the contract duration; this indicates, once more, the
important role of human capital accumulation. On the contrary, the transitions
between a job to another job are characterized by a slightly (above all in the
post-reform period) positive duration dependence meaning, as expected, that
the probability to leave a job for another increases with the contract duration.
My estimates show that unobserved heterogeneity (theta) is not always found,
and when it is found often assumes small values with the exception of the tran-
sition from a permanent contract toward an atypical job in the pre-reform (in
this case theta assumes value equal to 16.23). With respect to the transitions
out of a non-employment state to a permanent contract theta assumes value
0.17 in the pre-reform period and 0.47 in the post-reform one, while for tran-
sitions toward an atypical contract the unobserved heterogeneity parameter is
not found in the pre-reform period and it is very small (0.04) in the post-reform
one.
The covariate coefficients resulting from the estimates of the model allow
me to interpret the effects of the personal and job-related characteristics, and of
macroeconomic conditions, on the probability of moving from a state to another.
Illustrating my results, I show first the ones related to the transitions starting
from a non-working state and subsequently the ones related to the transitions
starting from a job position.
A positive effect is found by age variable referring to the transition from a
non-working condition toward a stable job, but it decreases after the introduc-
tion of Treu Package (from +0.63 to+ 0.53). With respect to the transitions
toward a new atypical contract, the effect, negative in the pre-reform period
the duration dependence parameter (1.97) for the AC-PC transition in the post-reform period,
meaning that one more month of contract duration doubled the probability of moving toward
a stable job. This version is available from the author on request.
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became positive in the post-reform one (respectively -0.51 and +0.10). My es-
timates therefore show that the probability of quitting a non-working state for
a stable job is higher as the age increases, because of the role of human capital
accumulation. Male workers have a higher probability of leaving a non-working
state than female workers (+0.07 for transitions toward PC and +0.6 for tran-
sitions toward an AC, in the pre-reform period), still the introduction of the
Treu Package has increased the gender differences for the transitions toward a
PC (+0.21) and it has decreased them for the transitions toward an atypical job
(+0.01). From a territorial point of view to live in northern regions on average
increases the probability of moving toward a new job while, as expected, south-
ern workers find more difficult to leave a non-employment position (-0.52 for
NW-PC and -0.39 for NW-AC). The introduction of the Treu Package seems to
have reduced territorial duality as showed also in figures 2 and 3, even though
the differences remain strong. The qualification variable shows that low skill
workers have more difficulty to move toward a stable job, and the reform has
slightly increased this effect (from -0.17 to -0.18). The coefficients related to
the transition toward an atypical contract show a positive but not significant
estimate in the pre-reform period and a negative and significant effect in the
post-reform one (-0.14). Economic sector dummies, one for the building sector
and another for the tourism sector, generally show a negative effect with respect
to other sectors, except for the tourism dummy in the post-reform period for
the transition toward a permanent contract (see tables 5a and 5b). The level
of wage in the previous job shows a not significant effect, while the part-time
dummy coefficient, related to previous employment, interpretable as evidence
of a negative effect, increases after the introduction of the Treu Package, on the
probability to leave a non-working-state (-0.18 for transitions toward a PC and
-0.16 for transitions toward an AC in the pre-reform, -0.27 in the post-reform,
with a not-significant estimate for transitions toward a PC). As expected, tenure
variable estimates show a positive effect toward leaving a non-working state for
a job position, but the introduction of the reform seems to have reduced this
effect. This result confirms, once more, that firms prefer to hire workers with
some work experiences. As anticipated, previous atypical contract experiences
play a negative role on the probability to reach a permanent contract, while a
positive effect is found related to the transitions toward an atypical job. The
introduction of the Treu reform has generally reduced these effects. In both
cases, my results seem to confirm that workers in a non-working position and
with previous AC experiences, are more likely to be reinserted in a job state
although first in an atypical job. This result depends on the fact that atypical
jobs allow firms to reduce the cost of testing the workers’ skills. Finally, the
employment growth variable included in order to catch macroeconomic effects,
shows a negative sign for the transitions toward a permanent contract and a
positive effect for the transitions toward an atypical contract. The first effect is
reduced after the Treu reform (from -0.17 to -0.03), while the second is increased
(from +0.00 to +0.11).
With respect to the flow out of a job position, the PC-AC transition in the
post-reform period is not estimated because the maximization likelihood process
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does not converge. Other transitions show the following results. A substantially
negative, and not always significant, effect is found related to the flow out of a
permanent contract, while a generally positive effect is shown for the transitions
out of an atypical job. Particularly interesting is the estimate related to the AC-
PC transition. A strong effect (+1.33) is found in the pre-reform period, while in
the post-reform one the effect even if positive is less strong (+0.71). Both cases
are consistent with the estimates of duration dependence parameters, indicating
that human capital accumulation plays a positive role in the transition from an
atypical contract toward a permanent job. The gender variable shows that male
workers starting from a permanent contract are more likely to reach a new
job, while female workers are more likely to move to a non-working condition,
implying a gender duality in the labour market. The introduction of the Treu
Package has reduced the gender duality for the PC-PC transition (from 0.32
to 0.12) and increased it for the PC-NW one (from -0.02 to -0.07). Starting
from an atypical contract male workers have a higher probability of leaving it,
except for the AC-AC transition in the post-reform period (-0.17), implying that
female workers, in the post-reform period, are more likely to have unstable work
histories. On the contrary, the probability to reach a permanent job starting
from an atypical contract is higher for male workers (+0.44 in the pre-reform
period and +0.43 in the post-reform one). North-western workers show, as
expected, that generally, the probability of reaching a new job position is higher
coming from a job rather than from a non-working condition. This effect is not
found for North-eastern workers, and this is evidence of a more dynamic labour
market. Finally southern workers show a strong probability of leaving a job for
a non-working condition rather than for a new job; however the introduction of
the Treu Package has slightly reduced the territorial duality.
With regard to AC-PC transitions the positive effect related to northern
workers is reduced in the North-West (from +0.45 to + 0.31) and it increases in
the North-East (from +0.23 to +0.39), while the negative effect decreases in the
South of Italy (from -2.37 to -1.43). With respect to the qualification variable a
positive sign of the coefficients emerges, even though not always significant, im-
plying more dynamic work histories for low skill workers, both in the transitions
toward a new job and toward a non-working state. The introduction of the Treu
Package substantially has increased this trend, confirming more unstable work
histories for few qualified workers. With respect to economic sector dummies,
significant estimates show that workers employed in the tourism or building sec-
tors, as expected, are more likely to reach a non-working state rather than a job
position, showing the instability of this type of jobs. Only some cases of wage
variable show significant estimates, negative in the pre-reform period, positive
and smaller in the post-reform one. The part-time variable shows a significant
and positive coefficient only for PC-NW transitions in the post-reform period
(+0.13), indicating that a part-time work experience is more likely to lead to
a non-working state. Work experience, indicated as tenure (months previously
worked), shows an expected positive sign for transitions toward a new job and a
negative sign for transitions toward a non-working condition, confirming, once
more, the positive effect of human capital on the probability of obtaining a job.
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Previous atypical job experience dummies show rarely significant estimates, and
in those cases, as expected, a positive effect is found related to the transition
toward a new job and a negative effect is found for the transition toward a
non-employment state. Finally, the employment growth variable, introduced
in order to catch business cycle effects, not always shows significant estimates.
In the pre-reform period, negative signs are found for PC-PC, PC-NW, AC-
PC and AC-NW transitions (respectively -0.13, -0.08, -0.31 and -0.14). In the
post-reform period only AC-NW transitions show a significant estimate (-0.11).
Not all significant estimates show a plausible sign, since in a positive business
cycle the decreased probability of transition toward a non-working state is plau-
sible, but it is less possible to explain its negative sign related to the transition
AC-PC.
5 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to address questions linked to the Italian
labour market reform, introduced by the Treu Law. In the first place, I was
interested in possible changes in duration dependence related to the transitions
starting from a non-working state. Secondly, I analyzed the effect of previous
atypical contract experiences on the probability of moving towards a permanent
contract. Finally, I studied if the probability of reaching a permanent contract
is higher when starting from a non-working state or from an atypical job.
Empirical analysis was carried out estimating the hazard rates among the
possible states: permanent contracts, atypical contracts or a non-employment
condition. My estimates are obtained applying a Mixed Proportional Hazard
model with competing risk to a sub-sample composed of individuals aged 16 to
32, drawn from the WHIP dataset. I use only information included between
1995 and 1999 in order to get a homogenous sample from a legislative point of
view. My main findings are:
1. The larger use of atypical contractual forms, due to the introduction of
the Treu Package, provided a potential screening instrument for the hiring
policies of firms. In fact, in a more flexible labour market, with more job
opportunities, to be LTU may be an indicator of low productivity. Empir-
ically this finding consists in an increase of negative duration dependence
for the spells starting from a non-working state; i.e. a widening between
short-term unemployed and long-term unemployed duality;
2. Previous atypical contract experiences affect negatively the probability of
moving towards a permanent job if the state of origin is a non-working
condition. Clearly to be in a non-employment position after some job
experience may be a bad signal related to the worker’s abilities.
3. I do not find evidence that the probability of reaching a stable job is higher
starting from an atypical contract rather than from a non-employment
position. On the other hand, I find a positive duration dependence related
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to the transition AC-PC, and a positive effect of previous atypical job
experiences on the probability of moving towards a permanent contract.
These findings seem to suggest the existence of a positive “human capital
accumulation” effect on the probability of obtaining a stable job.
4. Heterogeneous effects are found related to gender, area and qualification
variables. In fact, male, northern and high qualified workers show, gen-
erally, a larger probability of finding a job starting both from an atypical
contract and a non-working state. The introduction of the Treu Law seems
to reduce gender and territorial differences.
All these findings suggest that the introduction of the Treu Law, extending
the use of atypical contract, allows for a larger efficiency in the hiring process of
firms. Besides it allows for a more dynamic labour market and it has contributed
to reduce, at least partially, gender and territorial duality.
On the other side, atypical job experiences can become an obstacle to the
probability of reaching a stable job, if the path to a permanent contract in-
cludes periods of inactivity, and for short AC experiences, that do not permit
to accumulate “human capital”.
In terms of policy implications, it can be suggested the necessity to promote
longer contractual durations and to facilitate training programs, during inactiv-
ity periods, in order to increase human capital accumulation. Besides, policies
should provide support to workers while searching for a job, contributing to
reduce non-employment state durations. Finally, these policies are necessary
above all for disadvantaged workers, as female, southern and low-skill workers,
who have more difficulty in finding a job.
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Atypical contract legislation in Italy  
Year Law Contents 
1955 n. 25 Introduction of apprenticeship contracts; 
1962 n. 230 Introduction of fixed-term contracts; 
1973 c.p.c. 409 Discipline on trial, fiscal and social security related to collaboration contracts; 
1983 n. 79 Extension of fixed-term contracts to all economic sectors; 
1984 n. 863 Enlargement of part-time criteria; Introduction of CFL; 
1987 n. 56 Extension of CFL to all economic sectors; Modifications to fixed-term contract legislation; 
1994 n. 236 Stage contracts in apprenticeship; 
1994 n. 451 Increase in the limit of age for CFL applicability; 
1995 n. 335 Reform of  compulsory and complementary social security system;   
1997   n. 196  (Treu Law) 
Introduction of temporary contracts (art. 1-11); 
Modification of sanctionary discipline of fixed-term contract (art. 12); 
Employment in research (art. 14); 
Variation of CFL applicability fro undeveloped area and invalids (art. 15); 
Extension of applicability of apprenticeship contract (art.16); 
1997 n. 469 Privatization and decentralization of jobcentre; 
2001 d.lgs. n. 368 Extension of applicability of fixed-term contracts; 
2003 n. 30  Introduction of the Biagi Law; 
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Table 2. Unemployment rate, young unemployment rate, LTU and atypical contracts in some European countries 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
urate 10.0% 10.4% 10.0% 10.1% 9.8% 9.3% 8.5% 7.6% 7.2% 7.6% 8.0% 8.1%
Young urate 21.4% 21.8% 21.0% 21.2% 20.6% 19.0% 17.1% 15.3% 15.1% 15.6% 16.3% 16.6%
LTU 44.0% 48.1% 49.0% 48.5% 49.0% 47.3% 45.9% 44.7% 43.1% 40.8% 41.3% 42.0%
AC 11.0% 11.5% 12.0% 12.0% 12.4% 13.0% 13.4% 13.7% 13.5% 13.1% 13.1% 13.6%
urate 9.5% 9.1% 8.6% 8.4% 8.7% 9.0% 9.0%
Young urate 19.4% 18.4% 17.4% 17.6% 18.1% 18.6% 18.7%
LTU 47.4% 45.1% 45.3% 45.2% 44.8% 44.4% 45.6%
AC 9.3% 8.9% 8.7% 8.4% 8.0% 8.2% 8.4% 8.3%
urate 10.1% 10.6% 11.2% 11.2% 11.3% 11.3% 10.9% 10.1% 9.1% 8.6% 8.4% 8.0%
Young urate 30.1% 29.1% 30.3% 30.4% 30.2% 29.9% 28.7% 27.0% 24.1% 23.1% 23.7% 23.6%
LTU 56.4% 61.3% 63.4% 65.2% 64.6% 59.3% 61.5% 62.4% 62.6% 59.3% 58.3% 50.0%
AC 6.2% 6.8% 7.4% 7.4% 7.9% 8.6% 9.5% 10.1% 9.8% 9.9% 9.9% 11.8%
urate 7.7% 8.3% 8.0% 8.5% 9.1% 8.8% 7.9% 7.2% 7.4% 8.2% 9.0% 9.5%
Young urate 15.0% 15.6% 14.9% 15.6% 16.2% 15.0% 12.7% 10.6% 12.8% 14.2% 14.7% 15.1%
LTU 40.3% 44.6% 48.8% 48.2% 50.5% 51.1% 51.9% 51.4% 50.0% 47.6% 50.0% 51.6%
AC 10.3% 10.4% 10.5% 11.2% 11.8% 12.4% 13.1% 12.7% 12.4% 12.0% 12.2% 12.4%
urate 11.1% 11.7% 11.1% 11.6% 11.5% 11.1% 10.5% 9.1% 8.4% 8.9% 9.5% 9.7%
Young urate 27.1% 28.6% 27.0% 28.5% 28.4% 25.6% 23.4% 20.1% 19.4% 20.0% 21.1% 22.0%
LTU 35.1% 38.5% 39.6% 38.8% 40.9% 40.5% 39.0% 38.5% 35.7% 34.8% 38.9% 40.2%
AC 10.9% 11.5% 12.4% 12.8% 13.4% 13.9% 14.5% 15.2% 14.6% 13.5% 12.7% 12.8%
urate 18.6% 19.8% 18.8% 18.2% 17.1% 15.3% 12.9% 11.5% 10.7% 11.5% 11.5% 11.0%
Young urate 38.4% 40.2% 37.8% 37.2% 34.6% 31.3% 25.8% 22.9% 21.7% 22.3% 22.7% 22.1%
LTU 49.5% 55.6% 55.9% 52.7% 52.0% 50.3% 45.7% 41.7% 36.4% 33.9% 33.9% 31.8%
AC 33.0% 34.2% 35.2% 33.8% 33.5% 33.0% 32.9% 32.2% 32.2% 31.8% 31.8% 32.5%
urate 10.0% 9.3% 8.5% 8.0% 6.9% 6.2% 5.9% 5.4% 5.0% 5.1% 4.9% 4.7%
Young urate 17.6% 16.4% 15.3% 15.0% 13.7% 13.1% 12.8% 12.3% 11.9% 12.1% 12.3% 12.1%
LTU 42.0% 44.1% 42.4% 38.8% 36.2% 30.6% 28.8% 25.9% 26.0% 21.6% 22.4% 21.3%
AC 6.3% 6.9% 7.2% 7.3% 7.6% 7.3% 7.0% 6.9% 6.7% 6.4% 6.1% 6.0%
France
Spain
UK
UE15
UE25
Italy
Germany 
 
Source: European Commission, Employment in Europe in 2005 
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Table 3. Evolution of share of new atypical contracts stipulated, by years and population groups 
All
Year North-west North-east South-islands Male Female Low-skills High-skills
<= 1985 9.34% 13.03% 11.95% 12.06% 10.33% 15.23% 1.50% 11.43%
1995 20.91% 27.08% 17.97% 23.51% 20.65% 24.91% 11.44% 22.51%
1996 20.30% 28.76% 18.22% 23.97% 21.04% 25.12% 13.37% 22.94%
1997 20.90% 28.28% 20.09% 24.94% 20.90% 25.93% 14.27% 23.45%
1998 27.75% 35.09% 29.45% 31.98% 29.91% 33.93% 21.93% 31.19%
1999 32.29% 34.08% 25.44% 30.32% 32.15% 32.86% 24.56% 31.00%
growth rate 85-99 245.71% 161.54% 112.90% 151.44% 211.22% 115.77% 1537.30% 171.25%
growth rate 95-99 54.39% 25.85% 41.56% 28.99% 55.72% 31.95% 114.65% 37.74%
Area Gender Qualification
 
Source: my elaboration on WHIP dataset 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by origin state 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 24.12 4.29 24.86 3.83 20.67 3.86 24.40 4.37 24.47 4.32 25.49 3.93 21.76 3.90 24.59 4.36
Male 0.65 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.68 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49
North-West 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
North-East 0.32 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47
Centre 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34
South-Islands 0.22 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
Low skills 0.82 0.39 0.79 0.40 0.89 0.31 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.41 0.75 0.43 0.84 0.37 0.81 0.39
High skills 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.40 0.11 0.31 0.18 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39
Buildings 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
Tourism 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.37
Other sectors 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.70 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.45
Wage 52.84 47.26 56.07 49.62 43.68 44.25 52.29 45.26 53.91 50.03 57.09 55.32 44.01 27.95 54.78 51.06
Part-time 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.35 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.33
Tenure 29.89 34.46 27.38 33.06 11.80 21.78 37.75 36.44 30.61 38.00 31.83 39.30 13.47 24.25 35.76 39.17
zero AC experiences 0.58 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.65 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.51 0.50
one AC experiences 0.24 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45
two AC experiences 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
three AC experiences 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
Employment growth 0.12 0.89 0.09 0.89 0.20 0.83 0.12 0.90 1.07 0.66 1.06 0.67 1.16 0.63 1.05 0.66
All (obs. 29803) All (obs. 40003)
POST REFORMPRE REFORM
AC (obs.6705) NW (obs.18543)PC (obs.13053) AC (obs.3805) NW (obs.12945) PC (obs.15755)
Source: my elaboration on WHIP dataset 
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Table 5a. MPH model hazard rate estimates with unobserved heterogeneity (Pre-reform) 
covariates b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
age -0.19 0.13 -0.54 0.50 -0.33 0.04 *** 1.33 0.26 *** 0.15 0.50 -0.12 0.06 ** 0.63 0.04 *** -0.51 0.07 ***
age square 0.00 0.00 * 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 *** -0.03 0.01 *** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 ** -0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 ***
male 0.32 0.09 *** 0.94 0.42 ** -0.02 0.03 0.44 0.19 ** 0.23 0.32 0.08 0.05 * 0.07 0.03 *** 0.06 0.06
north-west 0.18 0.11 0.17 0.48 -0.08 0.03 ** 0.45 0.21 ** 0.24 0.46 0.02 0.07 0.24 0.04 *** -0.12 0.09
north-east 0.26 0.12 ** 0.77 0.51 0.09 0.04 ** 0.23 0.23 0.89 0.44 ** 0.34 0.06 *** 0.29 0.04 *** 0.13 0.08
south-islands -0.91 0.17 *** -1.36 0.81 * 0.03 0.04 -2.37 0.53 *** -1.97 0.93 ** -0.28 0.09 *** -0.52 0.05 *** -0.39 0.12 ***
low skills 0.08 0.10 -0.05 0.43 0.20 0.03 *** 0.07 0.22 1.40 1.04 0.18 0.08 ** -0.17 0.03 *** 0.01 0.10
buildings 0.19 0.11 * -0.02 0.50 0.25 0.03 *** -0.12 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.05 0.06 -0.26 0.04 *** -0.23 0.08 ***
tourism -0.24 0.13 * -0.88 0.64 0.48 0.03 *** -0.91 0.51 * -19.48 7233.71 0.63 0.06 *** -0.04 0.04 -0.57 0.08 ***
wage 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 ** -0.02 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
part-time 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.53 0.05 0.03 -0.78 0.52 -0.04 1.04 0.06 0.11 -0.18 0.04 *** -0.16 0.12
tenure 0.01 0.00 *** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 ** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00
1 AC prev. exp. -0.04 0.10 -0.70 0.51 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.20 0.56 0.33 * -0.16 0.05 *** -0.10 0.03 *** 0.79 0.08 ***
2 AC prev. exp. 0.05 0.13 -0.30 0.61 -0.09 0.04 ** 0.20 0.22 -0.25 0.53 -0.26 0.07 *** -0.10 0.04 ** 0.86 0.09 ***
3+ AC prev. exp. -0.05 0.15 0.61 0.54 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.25 1.13 0.43 *** -0.12 0.08 -0.12 0.05 ** 0.92 0.10 ***
employm. growth -0.13 0.07 * -0.25 0.32 -0.08 0.02 *** -0.31 0.18 * -0.38 0.29 -0.14 0.04 *** -0.17 0.02 *** 0.00 0.05
constant -3.65 1.58 ** -0.69 5.97 1.55 0.43 *** -22.40 2.99 *** -8.48 5.38 -0.89 0.69 -10.68 0.47 *** 2.78 0.81 ***
Log-likelihood
observations
individuals
failure 62186
3322
3805
-4556.6
140879462415
12945
9878
-686.7 -297.3 -4689.1 -15315.6
836 49 8049
-323.0 -15693.2-3206.5
13053
10005
PC-PC PC-AC PC-NW AC-PC AC-AC AC-NW NW-PC NW-AC
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Table 5b. MPH model hazard rate estimates with unobserved heterogeneity (Post-reform) 
covariates b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e. b s.e.
age 0.42 0.14 *** -0.24 0.04 *** 0.71 0.22 *** 0.21 0.22 -0.41 0.05 *** 0.53 0.04 *** 0.10 0.05 *
age square -0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
male 0.12 0.09 -0.07 0.03 ** 0.43 0.17 *** -0.17 0.16 0.10 0.04 ** 0.21 0.03 *** 0.01 0.04
north-west 0.12 0.12 -0.18 0.04 *** 0.31 0.24 0.53 0.29 * -0.18 0.06 *** 0.27 0.04 *** 0.22 0.06 ***
north-east 0.04 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.39 0.24 0.68 0.28 ** 0.02 0.06 0.34 0.04 *** 0.24 0.06 ***
south-islands -0.80 0.15 *** 0.00 0.05 -1.43 0.38 *** -0.63 0.38 * -0.23 0.07 *** -0.20 0.05 *** -0.40 0.07 ***
low skills 0.44 0.10 *** 0.45 0.03 *** 0.27 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.31 0.07 *** -0.18 0.04 *** -0.14 0.06 **
buildings 0.14 0.12 0.35 0.04 *** -0.54 0.27 ** -0.31 0.27 0.16 0.06 *** -0.11 0.04 ** -0.17 0.06 ***
tourism 0.03 0.13 0.77 0.04 *** -0.04 0.30 -0.43 0.33 0.86 0.05 *** 0.11 0.04 *** -0.51 0.06 ***
wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 **
part-time -0.11 0.12 0.13 0.04 *** 0.32 0.29 -0.23 0.35 0.08 0.08 -0.27 0.04 *** -0.27 0.07 ***
tenure 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 *** 0.01 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 ***
1 AC prev. exp. 0.07 0.10 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 -0.10 0.20 -0.05 0.05 -0.13 0.03 *** 0.63 0.05 ***
2 AC prev. exp. 0.18 0.13 -0.05 0.05 0.41 0.22 * 0.47 0.22 ** -0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.74 0.06 ***
3+ AC prev. exp. 0.22 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.47 0.25 * 0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.77 0.07 ***
employm. growth 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.14 -0.08 0.14 -0.11 0.03 *** -0.03 0.02 0.11 0.03 ***
constant -11.64 1.81 *** 0.51 0.51 -15.69 2.67 *** -8.36 2.56 *** 2.05 0.56 *** -9.93 0.48 *** -3.75 0.61 ***
log-likelihood
observations
individuals
failure
not converged
14061573012392
759 7490 196 182 2995 7963 2805
-7321.5 -19190.9 -8700.3
15755 6705 18543
-3259.4 -17560.5 -921.1 -889.4
PC-PC PC-AC PC-NW AC-PC AC-AC AC-NW NW-PC NW-AC
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Table 6a. Duration dependence without Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Transition estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
PC-PC 1.14 0.03 1.08 0.03
PC-AC 1.04 0.12 0.99 0.08
PC-NW 0.95 0.01 0.86 0.01
TC-PC 1.32 0.08 1.07 0.07
TC-TC 1.16 0.12 1.05 0.07
TC-NW 1.01 0.02 0.89 0.01
NW-PC 0.92 0.01 0.85 0.01
NW-TC 0.96 0.02 0.92 0.02
Duration dependence parameter
Pre-reform Post-reform
 
Baseline hazard: Weibull specification 
 
 
 
Table 6b. Duration dependence with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Transition estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e. estimate s.e.
PC-PC 1.15 0.03 1.08 0.03 0.83 0.22 0.78 0.24
PC-AC 1.10 0.14 - - 16.23 17.27 - -
PC-NW 0.95 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.03
TC-PC 1.32 0.08 1.08 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TC-TC 1.16 0.12 1.05 0.07 0.45 0.77 0.00 0.00
TC-NW 1.01 0.02 0.89 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
NW-PC 0.96 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.47 0.04
NW-TC 0.96 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.06
Duration dependence parameter Unobserved Heterogeneity
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
 
Baseline hazard: Weibull specification, Unobserved Heterogeneity: Gamma distributed 
 
 
 
 
  29
Figure 1. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving a NW (North-West) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%; 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 2. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving a NW (South-Islands) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 3. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving a PC (North-West) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 4. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving a PC (South-Islands) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 5. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving an AC (North-West) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 6. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: leaving an AC (South-Islands) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 7. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: reaching a PC (North-West) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 8. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: reaching a PC (South-Islands) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, no AC previous experiences, 
employment growth: 0.6%. 0 = pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. 
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Figure 9. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: NW-PC transitions by number of previous AC experiences (North-West) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skill, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, employment growth: 0.2%. first 0 
= pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. Second 0 = number of AC experiences; 3 = number of AC experiences; 
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Figure 10. Monthly predicted Hazard rate: NW-PC transitions by number of previous AC experiences (South-Islands) 
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Reference category: 25 years old, male, low skills, no buildings, no tourism, no part-time, wage: 50 euro per day, tenure: 20 months, employment growth: 0.6%. first 0 
= pre-reform period; 1 = post-reform period. Second 0 = number of AC experiences; 3 = number of AC experiences; 
 
 
